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Abstract: This paper is a response to Uriah Kriegel’s “Consciousness, Permanent Self-Awareness, and 
Higher-Order Monitoring” (Kriegel 2002) interpreted with my knot models of consciousness. In his 
paper, Kriegel argues that permanent self-awareness accompanies every conscious state, which I present 
in a trefoil knot model that provides some features of consciousness which were not captured in the pre-
existing models of consciousness. By doing so, I will also show that the core of the consciousness 
discussion is related to the structure and the relationship between the observing and the observed self. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
1-1. Consciousness, Self-Awareness, and Knots 
This paper is a response to Uriah Kriegel’s “Consciousness, Permanent Self-Awareness, and 
Higher-Order Monitoring” (Kriegel 2002) interpreted with my knot models of consciousness. 
Kriegel refers to the phenomenon that one with a conscious experience is aware of oneself as the 
experience owner having permanent self-awareness which is differentiated from introspective 
awareness (Kriegel 2002, 518). The main object of a permanent self-awareness involving 
experience is whatever external condition is experienced, while the main object of introspective 
awareness is the subject’s internal experience (Kriegel 2002, 518). One of the differences 
between these two phenomena, Kriegel explains, is that permanent self-awareness accompanies 
every conscious state, while introspective awareness is rare (Kriegel 2002, 519). The other 
difference is that the focus of the experience of introspective awareness is directed at oneself, 
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while permanent self-awareness is typically a peripheral component of conscious state, which 
means one’s awareness of oneself as the experience owner remains peripheral (Kriegel 2002, 
519). Permanent self-awareness is not introspective this way – in the way that it consumes the 
subject’s attention (Kriegel 2002, 519). However, a single state cannot involve permanent self-
awareness, rather there is a temporally extended, permanent self-awareness (Kriegel 2002, 520). 
And each particular mental state takes part in this stretch of self-awareness (Kriegel 2002, 520). 
Therefore, even if a particular state does not permanently involve self-awareness, the self-
awareness it involves is permanent. This is what Kriegel refers to as “a state involving permanent 
self-awareness” or “a permanent self-awareness involving state” (Kriegel 2002, 520). 
I second Kriegel’s argument and will try to visualize his models anew by utilizing knots, which 
could capture some features of consciousness that were not so clearly presented or slipped out in 
the pre-existing models provided by Kriegel. But why knots? What can knots say, or rather, show 
about consciousness? Following the progression of Kriegel’s arguments, I will summarize and 
introduce his models of consciousness and show the possibility of applying my knot-models to 
his consciousness model. And in the end, I will present the trefoil knot as an alternative model of 
the structure of consciousness, which is a state involving permanent self-awareness. 
 
1-2. The Paradox of Self: Problem of the PSA Model 
One could still ask though, why consciousness? Or rather, knots and consciousness? 
Consciousness indicates an awareness of something, either awareness of an object or awareness 
of self. Being aware of something is related to, roughly speaking, knowing and knowing that we 
know. The act of seeing as the most primitive perception represents this ‘knowing’ as being 
aware. This seeing is not only seeing an actual object in reality, but it includes the meta level of 
seeing, which points at self-observation. This means seeing myself, or seeing myself seeing (an 
object). 
Observation is the beginning of not only understanding, but also understanding understanding in 
knot-theory-represented topological space. Knots and consciousness share their fundamental 
domain in the act of seeing, therefore, knots could be useful for mapping the theoretical models 
of consciousness. 
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Self-observation presumes the differentiated self, which means that both the self that is seeing 
and the self that is seen, exist. The problem of the pre-existing consciousness models is that they 
do not show this relationship nor explain the act between these differentiated yet identical self(s).  
 (a) Self (the observing) = Self (the observed) 
 (b) Self (the observing) ≠ Self (the observed) 
*(a) and (b) are the same and different at the same time. 
What we need to be able to represent is a structure of self that is two-fold. 
(1) Seeing (one)self always comes with seeing not-self.  
Therefore, this is a two-layered seeing: seeing an object (not-I) and seeing myself (I). 
This seen self is always an othered self.  
(2) Seeing an object always comes with seeing myself. (Permanent Self-Awareness) 
(Even if we are not necessarily aware of this meta-seeing (seeing myself) every time I see 
an object.) 
These two are fundamentally linked. Or, it could be stated they are two contents of one and the 
same mental state. This paradoxical structure of self in the process of “self-awareness” is not 
captured in the PSA models. It is difficult to visualize this, because (1) it is in the structure of a 
paradox, and (2) the double layers of one process need to be presented intertwined. The one layer 
is the structure of the observer and the object, and the other is the intrinsic structure of self both 
as the observer and the observed. Each layer could be presented and connected to the other, 
while each layer is still presented as a separate mental content. This connection is weak, i.e. 
external. The connection of these two different things does not guarantee that these contents are 
the two contents of one and the same state. With knots, however, it is possible to visualize (1) the 
paradox model, and (2) the multi-layered relationship in a unitary structure (process as a whole).  
 
2. A Higher-Order Monitoring Model of Permanent Self-Awareness 
Kriegel introduces a Higher-Order Monitoring model of permanent self-awareness (Kriegel 2002, 
520). It is yet to be proven whether the Higher-Order Monitoring theory can be successfully 
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interpreted as an illuminating model of permanent self-awareness (Kriegel 2002, 520). 
According to Higher-Order Monitoring theories, for my experience of an object to be conscious, 
is for it to be accompanied by a suitable second-order state representing it (Kriegel 2002, 520). In 
this context, however, the second-order state must be both roughly simultaneous with the first-
order state and formed non-observationally and non-inferentially (Rosenthal 1990, also see 
Kriegel 2002, 520). Higher-Order Monitoring theorists are still divided as far as their 
interpretation of what kind of second-order state this might be. According to Higher-Order 
Perception theory, second-order state is a perception-like state, while for Higher-Order Thought 
theorists, it is a thought (Kriegel 2002, 521). Here, Kriegel focuses on David Rosenthal’s Higher-
Order Thought account.  
Let’s say there is a purple cube as an object of a conscious experience. “According to Rosenthal, 
having a conscious experience of a purple cube is a psychological structure involving the 
concurrence (more or less) of two mental states” (Kriegel 2002, 521): first-order state (S1) and 
second-order state (S2). The content of a first-order state is purple cube and the content of a 
suitable second-order state is I am seeing a purple cube. S2 represents not only the occurrence of 
S1, but also its occurrence in the subject. “This means that having conscious experiences requires 
the possession – and deployment – of a concept of self” (Kriegel 2002, 521). Kriegel applies this 
aspect of the theory to account for permanent self-awareness. The idea is that S1 involves 
permanent self-awareness because it is accompanied by a mental state that represents its 
occurrence in the self (Kriegel 2002, 521) as described explicitly by Rosenthal: “A strong 
intuitive connection obtains between being in a conscious state and being conscious of oneself. 
[…] Higher Order Thought theory explains the phenomenon […] successfully, since one’s 
Higher Order Thoughts refer to oneself” (Rosenthal 1990, 744-45; see also Kriegel 2002, 521). 
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Kriegel visualizes this as below (Kriegel 2002, 521). 
Figure 1
1
 
 
2-1. Layers of Cognition 
When one regards these different states as layers of cognition, or what happens in consciousness, 
the question would then be how they are structured – in this case, layered. These layers should 
belong to one’s consciousness. Note that here the notion of belongingness plays a key role. I 
regard these two different states of the same act as two states that belong together to one and the 
same mental act. Before we talk more about this belongingness, let me try to visualize this 
layered structure. A picture of these layers could show the belonging relationship between the 
two states, namely that they are actually the two states of one mental act. Layers visualize the 
wholeness of this process better than the other model with only arrows on an infinitely open 
plane.
2
 
Figure 2 
 
                                                          
1
 “Figure 1. Permanent self-awareness in the HOT model” (Kriegel 2002, 521). 
2
 It is also because layers provide borders which illuminate the distinctive ontological status of consciousness itself 
as the subject of the perceived, differentiating itself from the perceived (observed), yet in the perceived as part of 
themselves as well. 
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Kriegel points out that a Higher Order Thought model accounts for the difference between 
permanent self-awareness and introspective awareness (Kriegel 2002, 521). The problem of this 
model is, however, that in this model, S2 represents the property, an extrinsic property of S1 
which makes S1 involve permanent self-awareness. Therefore, S2 itself is not conscious (Kriegel 
2002, 521). Kriegel shows that a third-order thought (S3) is required, for S2 to be conscious 
(Kriegel 2002, 521). This is what happens in cases of introspective awareness (Kriegel 2002, 
521). This means that one has a second-order thought as “I am seeing a purple cube” 
accompanied by a third-order thought as “I am thinking that I am seeing a purple cube” (Kriegel 
2002, 522). And Kriegel presents the following figure to visualize this structure (Figure 2, 
Kriegel 2002, 522). 
Figure 3
3
 
 
                                                          
3
 “Figure 2. Introspective awareness in the HOT model” (Kriegel 2002, 522). 
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Again, here is my layer-version of this structure of different states.  
Figure 4 
 
2-2. Belongingness (Mutuality) of the Layers 
This model, however, comes with two conspicuous defects. First, in the case of the conscious 
experience of the purple cube, in this model, “neither the monitoring state S2 nor the monitored 
state S1 is in and of itself conscious. The consciousness of S1 derives from its embedding in a 
relational structure, it is not intrinsic to it. Taken out of this structure, S1 becomes non-conscious. 
But if neither S1 nor S2 is in itself conscious, then it is conceivable that there should be a zombie 
who harbours both states but has no PSA [permanent self-awareness] whatsoever” (Kriegel 2002, 
522). Second, “the second-order state S2, in virtue of which S1 is conscious, is itself a non-
conscious state. So, the fact that S2 represents the self does not imply that, by having S2, the self 
is conscious of itself, for S2 is not a conscious representation of the self” (Kriegel 2002, 522-523). 
Taking into consideration that consciousness of self requires that the self be in the content of a 
conscious state, there is no real self-awareness in the Higher Order Thought model, because this 
model attributes to the subject a presentation of itself, but a non-conscious one (Kriegel 2002, 
523). 
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If these problems are interpreted in the grammar of belongingness
4
, whether the layers of orders 
– states – are in themselves conscious, the question is whether the layers belong to each other – 
for instance, the layer S1 belongs to S2, and S2 to S3, or in a reversed way – and/or if they belong 
to one’s consciousness. The inevitable temporal gaps between different layers, monitoring and 
monitored states, must be somehow reconciled in order to guarantee the consistency and the 
identity of these layers as layers of one’s conscious experience as a whole. In other words, these 
separate layers need to belong together to constitute a conscious experience. And this 
belongingness resolves the difference of the temporal gaps. 
 
3. The Brentanian Model of Permanent Self-Awareness 
3-1. Permanent Self-Awareness and Introspective Awareness in Brentano’s Model 
The belongingness solution can be better applied and represented in accordance with the next 
model that Kriegel presents, a model that preserves many of the theoretical resources of the 
Higher Order Thought model but still attempts to satisfy the further demands, namely the 
Brentanian model of permanent self-awareness (Kriegel 2002, 523). Kriegel explains that 
“according to Brentano, a conscious experience of a purple cube has two representational 
contents. The primary content is given by the purple cube. The secondary content is given by the 
experience of the purple cube. Thus, the experience represents primarily the cube and 
secondarily itself. More specifically, it represents itself precisely as a representation of the cube, 
and its primary content is embedded in its secondary content. Thus, the representation of the 
cube, and the representation of the representation of the cube, are wrapped up together in a single 
mental act” (Kriegel 2002, 524; emphasis added). Therefore, this experience is both a perception 
of itself and a thought about itself (Kriegel 2002, 524). The emphasis lies on “all wrapped up 
together in a single mental act” (Kriegel 2002, 524). In other words, they belong together to a 
single mental act. 
Kriegel shows this in the following figure (Figure 3, Kriegel 2002, 525) and explains: “Whatever 
the subject’s experience is primarily directed at (whether the sight of a purple cube or the sound 
                                                          
4
 The notion of belongingness in knot logic is to be discussed in a detailed manner in a separate paper, “An 
Application of Kauffman’s Knot Logic to the Brentanian Model of Permanent Self-Awareness.” 
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of a bagpipe), it is also (therewith) directed at the fact that the subject is having such an 
experience (see Figure 3). Hence, the subject's permanent self-awareness. In the Brentanian 
model, then, an experience is conscious just in case it represents (secondarily) that the subject 
herself is having that very experience” (Kriegel 2002, 524-525). 
Figure 5
5
 
 
This self-awareness involved in ordinary conscious experience is differentiated from 
introspective awareness, because the self-awareness experience represents itself only secondarily, 
while introspective awareness would be awareness in which the mental act would be its own 
primary object, according to Brentano (Kriegel 2002, 525). Introspective awareness in 
Brentano’s model looks as below: 
Figure 6
6
 
In fact, “the two mental contents posited by Brentano are basically the same as the two posited 
by Rosenthal. However, instead of having them carried by different mental states, Brentano has 
them carried by one and the same state. This has the advantage of theorizing PSA as intrinsic to 
                                                          
5
 “Permanent self-awareness in Brentano’s model” (Kriegel 2002, 525). 
6
 “Figure 4. Introspective awareness in Brentano’s model” (Kriegel 2002, 525). 
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the conscious state. A state involves PSA not in virtue of being suitably represented by another 
mental state, but in virtue of its own representational profile” (Kriegel 2002, 525; emphasis 
added). 
This solution is also the very difficulty of the Brentanian model – the “mysteriousness” of the 
model. “What is mysterious about Brentanian experiences is specifically the fact that they 
represent themselves” (Kriegel 2002, 526; emphasis added). The riddle of Brentanian model that 
we need to solve is that of self-representation.
7
  
 
3-2. Paradox: Self-Representation and Self-Membership 
The problem of the Brentanian model lies the intuitive difficulty to understand the mechanisms 
underlying this capacity for self-representation. “What exactly is this capacity is supposed to 
amount to?” (Kriegel 2002, 526). How can two different mental contents be carried by one and 
the same mental state? In other words, one mental state is one, but at the same time not one. I 
restructure this problem in the framework of belongingness and mutuality. Namely, two different 
mental contents (seeing a thing and seeing oneself) belong together to one mental state. This 
unitary mental state represents a process itself as a whole, not two separate processes combined 
together.  
More precisely, seeing oneself in this process means seeing oneself seeing a thing. Therefore, the 
two mental contents of seeing a thing and seeing oneself should be reformulated as “seeing 
oneself seeing a thing.” In this context, the problem seems to be focused upon “seeing oneself,” 
because the “oneself” that is seen includes not only the self but also the self’s act of seeing at the 
same time. This is the core problem of self-representation: How can one represent oneself? In 
other words, how can one be the observer and the observed at the same time? This observed self 
is the observer of a thing and itself at the same time. The core of this problem is the problem of 
self-membership. How can one be the container and the member at the same time? 
I attempt to suggest a way to logically comprehend this structure of self-representation or resolve 
this paradox by applying knot-logic by Louis Kauffman and present a new model which is knot-
                                                          
7
 Knotted models applied to Brentano’s models are to be presented in a separate paper with a detailed explanation of 
the related knot logic. 
11 
 
shaped. This is a paradox, because two different mental contents are presented by one and the 
same state. They are different yet the same. This paradox can be resolved in a knotted model. 
For example, here is a modified model of the Brentanian one with a twist which creates a knot 
link on it
8
. 
 
 
Figure 7 
 
 
Or, one can present the same model as below as well: 
Figure 8 
 
                                                          
8
 The knot link logic is to be also discussed in another paper along with the logic of belongingness. 
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The crucial point of this model lies in the loop. This is one seamless ring that is twisted once in 
the middle. This twist creates a crossing on the ring. At this crossing, this one ring becomes two. 
The line that goes on the top and the line that goes on the bottom at the crossing are still the same 
ring. In other words, at each crossing a membership relationship is created. Membership is 
indicated by the diagram shown below (Kauffman 1995, 33). 
Figure 9 
Here, Kauffman shows that ‘a’ belongs9 to ‘b’ (a ↋ b). The arc ‘b’ is unbroken, while the arc ‘a’ 
is broken. “Following the pictorial convention of illustrating one arc passing behind another by 
putting a break in the arc that passes behind one, one says that a passes under b” (Kauffman 
1995, 33). At the crossing, in both Figure 7 and 8, this membership relationship is created by a 
loop, but note that it is still one single ring. Therefore, in the above models, S1 and S2 belong 
together. 
Let’s say one walks on this twisted ring. At the crossing, one who started walking on the S1 side 
could see oneself on the other side S2 which is either above or under where one stands. Here a 
transformation of the status of the one who walks on the ring happens: one goes from an 
observer to the observed, i.e. the container becoming the member. 
What is significant about Figure 7 and the Figure 8 is that in these models, S1 and S2 are 
different and identical at the same time. In other words, the two different states S1 and S2 are 
wrapped up in and indicate a single mental act. Both figures, Figure 7 and 8, are a single ring but 
with a twist that creates a self-mutual relationship within itself.  
In this model, the first order state (seeing a purple cube) and the second order state (seeing 
myself seeing a purple cube) can appear to be conscious at the same time, i.e. belong together in 
                                                          
9
 This notion of belongingness is used in the domain of the knot set theory (see Kauffman 1995). 
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the same (identical) consciousness, yet they are two different stages of a conscious act.
10
 This 
solution can explain the belongingness of the different layers of mental states that are temporally 
separated as in Figure 3 and Figure 4. 
 
4. One More Representational Attempt by Kriegel 
Kriegel also presents a new model to overcome the difficulty of the Brentanian model. Namely, 
he attempts to find a model where a PSA-involving experience involves a conscious 
representation of the self without representing itself. He suggests a three-step psychological 
process model. “A three-step psychological process takes place in the subject. First, there is a 
non-conscious purely sensory reaction, S1 which registers the presence of a purple cube. Second, 
the occurrence of S1 brings about a second-order state, S2, which represents the occurrence of S1 
in the subject. Third, S2 also comes to represent the purple cube itself. At this stage, then, S2 
represents both that there is a purple cube and that one is, oneself, seeing the purple cube, but 
without representing itself. S2 is the PSA-involving conscious experience” (Kriegel 2002, 527). 
See the following figure. 
 
                                                          
10
 Kauffman approaches Russell’s paradox from a different point of view with this logic of self-membership: Let R 
be the set that contains all the sets that do not include themselves. If R contains itself, R does not include itself, but if 
R does not include itself, R should be a member of itself. S1 and S2 are different yet the same. We can resolve this 
paradox in the domain by having every set as a member of itself and not a member of itself (Kim forthcoming, see 
also Kauffman 1995, 40), which is visually represented on the loop created by a twist on a ring. Russell’s paradox 
becomes meaningful in the knot set domain (Kauffman 1995, 39) in the framework of membership and 
belongingness discourse. This is valid in the discussion of knot set theory as a radical variant of a set theory. I 
elaborate this logic more specifically in “An Application of Kauffman’s Knot Logic to the Brentanian Model of 
Permanent Self-Awareness” (Kim). 
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Figure 10
11
 
 
Concerning the difference between PSA and introspective awareness, he suggests that “we can 
avail ourselves of the Brentanian notions of primary and secondary content. When the primary 
content of S2 is the external cube, S2 involves only PSA; when its primary content is the internal 
cube sensation, S2 constitutes introspective awareness” (Kriegel 2002, 527). 
In effect, the knotted model with one crossing resolves the paradox of self-representation by 
having two different mental states belonging to each other, i.e. a unitary mental process. 
However, this knotted model still suffers another shortcoming. Namely, it is only two-fold, 
which is again problematic, because only the self-mutuality of the observing and the observed 
self is represented by this model. Which means, this model is not based on the necessary 
relationship between the process of seeing oneself and the process of seeing a thing. In other 
words, one can be aware of oneself without seeing a thing at the same time. The two-fold knotted 
model is good enough for representing the relationship between the observing self and the 
observed self, but it is not enough for representing the observation of an external object (purple 
cube) necessarily included in the process of self-awareness. In other words, the two-fold models 
are good for representing self-awareness but not a PSA-involving conscious experience. 
The whole point of the permanent self-awareness lies in that one is permanently aware of oneself 
when seeing an object that is not myself (or the othered self). The key point is that these models 
are supposed to show the necessary relationship between the process of seeing a thing and the 
process of seeing myself seeing it. 
 
5. Trefoil Knot Model of Consciousness I 
Kriegel’s model of a three-step psychological process could be a basis for a more advanced 
knotted model of a conscious experience. A simple self-membership created by a loop on a ring 
is applied to knot-models in order to help us comprehend the self-mutual and mutual 
                                                          
11
 “Figure 6. One more model of permanent self-awareness” (Kriegel 2002, 528). 
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membership relationship of knots. The trifold relationship between the states in Kriegel’s One 
more model of permanent self-awareness could be represented in a trefoil knot model. 
When I see a thing: 
 (a) A thing is sensed (as a non-conscious sensory reaction). 
 (b) I see the sensed thing (represented in my consciousness). 
 (c) I see myself seeing a thing. 
This is a three-fold process. Kriegel’s three-step psychological process model (figure 10) is the 
representation of these three steps. And this is one process, i.e. one mental act. In other words – 
in the sense of knot logic – they belong together to one mental state. This model includes the 
moment of ‘seeing a thing’ in its process. The problem of this model, however, as with the 
previous models, is that this model does not present the self-mutual relationship between the self 
as the observer, the self as the observed, and the process between these two othered selves. The 
self-mutuality means that it is in fact one and the same self. As mentioned above, the two-fold 
knot models with one crossing in the middle show the relationship between the observing and the 
observed self, but not the process
12
 nor the othered self while seeing an object. The defect of the 
earlier presented knotted models with one loop was that they had only two differentiated sides in 
one complete structure. We need three. This is where we can think of a trefoil knot.  
A trefoil knot is the simplest example of a nontrivial knot, which means that it is not possible to 
untie this knot in three dimensions without cutting it. It is one and the same ring. As the name of 
the knot indicates, this knot has three differentiated sides. Compare it to the above-presented 
knots with one twist with two differentiated sides (see figure 7, 8). These three steps do not 
happen one by one after one another in a temporal sequence, but rather happen all at once when I 
see a thing. Therefore, this can represent the complete inner-structure of the conscious act of 
seeing a thing. When I see a thing, it’s not only a thing that I see, but it’s a thing and myself at 
the same time that I see. Here, one twist wouldn’t do anymore, we need more than one crossing 
to include all three steps in one process. The three-step psychological process could fit the trifold 
structure of a trefoil knot, because these three different steps have to belong together, and the 
model needs to be able to show the self-mutuality of the different steps. 
                                                          
12
 The act of seeing an object 
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So, here is a trefoil knot: 
Figure 11 
There are three crossings in this knot where membership relationship is represented. In the case 
of a trefoil knot, the membership relationship at each crossing indicates a self-mutual 
relationship as in the previous knot models (Figure 7, 8), because a trefoil is a single seamless 
ring (A). I marked the three crossings on a trefoil knot, and they appear in the diagram below 
(Kim forthcoming):  
Figure 12 
“This shows the self-mutuality, because a trefoil knot consists of one seamless ring. Therefore, a 
trefoil knot represents a stable self-mutuality in three loops about itself: a = {a}” (Kim 
forthcoming). The self-mutual relationship at each crossing are as appears in the following table 
(Kim forthcoming): 
Crossing Belongingness 
Α A Є A  A = {A}  
Β A Є A  A = {A}  
Γ A Є A  A = {A}  
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The relationship of the three processes between S1 and S2 is self-mutual in the sense that they 
form a single mental act – perception of a purple cube. All three steps belong to one process in a 
trefoil knot. Therefore, the model (Figure 10) could be modified with a trefoil knot as below: 
Figure 13 
When applied to the three-step process (a), (b), and (c), each step should be marked on the trefoil 
knot as below, the (c) as the trefoil knot itself as a whole. 
Figure 14 
 
6. Trefoil Knot Model of Consciousness II 
However, I still have some problems with the three-step psychological process model. 
1) The first step of the three-step psychological process as a purely sensory reaction is not 
conscious yet, therefore, it is questionable if this stage could be included in this consciousness 
model. 
18 
 
2) Without the first step as a purely sensory reaction, this model does not differentiate itself 
much from the Brentanian model. This means that a one loop knot model would still do for this 
three-step process model. 
3) Therefore, this model does not seem to overcome the shortcoming of the previous models, 
which do not show the structure and the necessary relationship of the observing and the observed 
self. 
Instead, I suggest another three-step process: 
(a′) I see a thing. 
 (b′) I see(know) that I see a thing. 
 (c′) I see(know) that I see(know) that I see a thing. 
First, I remove the first step of a purely sensory reaction. Then I add another step (c′) which 
indicates the cognition of the whole process. This process seems to be holding the key to 
comprehension of the knotted model of consciousness, which would tell us something that has 
not yet been discussed about consciousness. This stage represents the original unity, i.e. identity 
of the differentiated
13
 states of self, as well as the unity of the different stages of the process. 
When these three steps are applied to a trefoil model, one could mark the different stages as 
below: 
Figure 15 
                                                          
13
 The differentiation refers not only to the differentiation of the observing self from the observed self, but also the 
differentiation of the self from the not-self, i.e. the observed external object. 
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This three-step process seems to fit the trefoil model better than the previous one, because each 
stage (a′), (b′), and (c′) constitute a trifold structure as a whole process, with each arc of the 
trefoil representing each stage. All three steps belong to one and the same process – a trefoil knot. 
Technically, in the previous three-step process, (a) could not belong to a consciousness model 
because it is not conscious, unless it is attached to the (b) step. The (a) and the (b) step could 
represent one arc of the trefoil knot together. Then the relationship is not quite trifold, because it 
is ((a)-(b))-(c), rather than (a)-(b)-(c). This two-fold relationship can be illustrated in the one link 
knot model. 
One might still ask whether the stage (c′) is not superfluous. No, it is not. This step (c′) is what 
brings about the trifold structure. This step is the binder
14
 of the other two steps (a′) and (b′) and 
represents the understanding of the whole process as a whole. The three steps on each arc of a 
trefoil knot are the different states of one act, but note that this is one and the same act, as a 
trefoil knot is one seamless ring. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16 
                                                          
14
 As the ultimate glue! Der Ursprung der Einheit des Prozesses. 
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When I see that I see a thing, the I who is observed by the first I is the observer of the thing that 
is observed. The point where these two states, “I see myself” and “I see a thing” is bound and 
therefore becomes one process, is the second I, who is observed by the first I and observing an 
object at the same time. The (c′) manifests the moment of seeing this process. Therefore, (c′) 
represents the act of observation itself.  
 
 
 
Figure 17 
 
In fact, this trifold structure manifests the inner structure of self. Let me reformulate the three-
step process as following: let’s say that I is the observing self, I′ is the observed self, and O is a 
thing (object). The arrow (→) represents the act of seeing. 
 
I → O 
I → (I → O) 
(I → O) = I′ 
I → (I → (I → O)) 
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I → (I → I′) 
(I → I′) = I′ 
↋ 
I → I′ 
 
Here we can see that the discussion of the permanent self-awareness and consciousness boils 
down to the structure and the relationship between the observing and the observed self. This is, 
however, still a trifold structure between the observing self, the observed self, and the 
observation. In the observation process, the observer and the observed are constantly switching 
back and forth.  
I already have shown this in another paper (Kim forthcoming): 
“The act of seeing – I (o) see my (present) self (s) – is the basis of the formation of ‘self-ness.’ In 
other words, I have to be able to see that I am there as I, for me to be able to perceive myself as I. 
The I that is observed is I but at the same time not the I, the observer. The subjective 
understanding of (my)self is based on the distinction of I and not-I and its identity. We can solve 
the paradox of I = -I with the knot logic of self-mutuality: not-I as knot-I.” 
Figure 18
15
 
                                                          
15
 Figure 27 (Kim forthcoming) 
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This feature – the inner structure of self – was not captured in the previous PSA models, which 
enables (justifies) the self-representational process of PSA in a trifold structure. The trefoil knot 
model not only represents its trifold structure, but also reveals
16
 the structure of self within itself. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The logic of mutuality and self-mutuality in the trefoil knot enables the visualization of the 
fundamental inter-relations of a subject’s conscious experience of self and others and their 
structure. This explains how we can be aware of myself and others at the same time. Conscious 
experience is possible through an interaction of the perception of self and the perception of not-
self (including other objects and observed self). This double perception occurs simultaneously. 
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 By “reveal” I mean, “makes visible, therefore, comprehensible.”  
